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INTRODUCTION 
The distinction between legal obligations imposed upon contracting 
parties and those imposed by statute, regulation or common law 
is the concept of consent. Lay persons, as well as legal theorists, 
generally regard a "meeting of the minds ''1 as a significant, if not 
necessary, step in the creation of an enforceable contract. Stated 
more precisely, a "meeting of the minds" refers to the assent of two 
or more individuals to identical intentions that they each possess 
with respect to the terms of a proposed understanding. The purpose 
of this article is to examine the historical, legal and philosophical 
foundations of this concept. 
I. THE PRIMACY PRINCIPLE 
Broadly stated, there are two competing legal theories of contract 
interpretation: the subjective school and the objective school. The 
subjective school asserts that in determining the existence of possible 
contract obligations, a court's highest priority should be to identify 
each parties' actual understanding of the purported terms to the 
contract, and, if their understandings are identical, then, irrespective 
of all other factors, to enforce these terms as the parties' binding 
agreement. This policy, the "Primacy Principle," finds approval in the 
repeated observation of judges, that courts cannot, and will not, make 
contracts between parties; courts merely enforce agreements that the 
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parties themselves have reached. 2 According to Professor Arthur 
Corbin, a proponent of the subjective school, the theory underlying 
the Primacy Principle was originally based upon the 16th century 
"so-called will theory of contracts" which held that a contract is 
made by the "voluntary agreement of men and not by the state. A 
man is not bound by a contractual duty unless he willed it so. ''3 
The subjective school does not apply the Primacy Principle with 
equal vigor in the inverse circumstance. Indeed, where discord exists 
between parties as to the terms of their supposed agreement, no legal 
theorist's claims that the Primacy Principle prevents the imposition 
of legal obligations. Obligations imposed in these circumstances are, 
however, based upon principles entirely unrelated to the "will theory 
of contracts." For example, in the Case of the Black Car, Party A 
desires to have his car painted red, but executes a written contract 
with Party B specifying the color black. Party B paints the car, but 
Party A later refuses to pay for the contracted work because the car 
was painted black not red. Assuming no other facts, in particular 
that Party A and Party B did not both intend, despite the contrary 
terms of their written contract, that the car would be painted red, the 
subjective school would render a judgment in favor of Party B. The 
rationale supporting this conclusion is that, even though the parties' 
actual intentions may have differed, and hence the Primacy Principle 
could not apply, Party B, in performing the work, reasonably and 
2 This phrase has been cited by American courts in countless instances. 
3 A. Corbin, 1 Corb in  on  Con t rac t s  §106, at 477 (1960). Professor Corbin was 
a special consultant of the Restatement of Contracts, 2d. The Primacy Principle 
is stated in rule form at § 201(1) of the Restatement 2d. "Where the parties have 
attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is 
interpreted in accordance with that meaning." In the comment to this section, the 
authors observe that "Subsection (1) makes it clear that the primary search is for 
a common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed on them by the law. 
To the extent that a mutual understanding is displaced by government regulation, 
the resulting obligation does not rest on 'interpretation' in the sense used here. 
The objective of interpretation in the general law of contracts is to carry out the 
understanding of the parties rather than to impose obligations on them contrary 
to their understanding: 'the courts do not make a contract for the parties. '" See 
Restatement of Contracts 2d, comment c. at p. 84. 
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detrimentally relied upon Party A's unambiguous manifestation of 
intent: black. 4 
In contrast to the subjective school, proponents of the objective 
school of contract interpretation place a higher priority on the acts of 
contracting parties on the parties' actual intentions. The difference 
between the subjective school and objective school is most succinctly 
stated by Professor Robert Birmingham: 
Subjective Theory: There is a contract if and only if the minds of the parties meet. 
Objective Theory: There is a contract according only to the outward manifestations 
of the parties? 
The most colorful iterations of this policy, however, were made by 
Learned Hand: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, 
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of 
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and 
represent a known intent. 6 
Under this formulation, the subjective school's search for a "meeting 
of the minds" is replaced by the objective school's search for a 
"meeting of the words." 
The debate between proponents of the objective and subjective 
schools has gone on for decades, and under other namesakes for cen- 
turies. Nevertheless, because unswerving allegiance to the principles 
espoused by each school requires both to adopt extreme positions 
in certain situations, neither school has been able to deal a decisive 
intellectual blow to its adversary. In this on-going debate, countless 
4 This rule is specifically provided for in the Restatement of Contracts, 2nd 
§201 (2)(b) which states - 
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to 
a promise or agreement or a term thereof it is interpreted 
in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them 
if at the time the agreement was made if 
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different 
meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason 
to know the meaning attached by the first party. 
5 Birmingham, "Holmes on 'Peerless:' Raffles v. Wichelhaus and the Objective 
Theory of Contract," 47 Univ of Pitt L Rev (1985): 183, 185. 
6 Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.E, 200 E 287, 293 (DCNY 1911). 
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refinements have been proposed to eliminate or minimize these diffi- 
culties. In an article entitled, "The Theory of Legal Interpretation, ''7 
Oliver Wendel Holmes added his brush to this canvas. Consistent 
with dicta by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Goode v. Riyal, 8 
Holmes suggested that the Primacy Principle should not apply to 
the use of proper names. Under Holmes' proposed exception, where 
parties to a written contract utilizing the term "Bunker Hill" actually 
meant (as a result of a secret code or otherwise) "Old South Church," 
but later disagree as to the meaning of the term, then, irrespective of 
their actual understanding or code, they would be held by a court to 
the "common meaning" of the written term: Bunker Hill. 9 
In addition to "common meaning," common sense supports 
Holmes' argument. When the parties to the fictitious Bunker Hill 
/ Old South Church example executed their written agreement, both 
were aware, or should have been, that if they were to later disagree 
on the terms of their understanding, the matter would come before 
a court for resolution. The court, in turn, would not be familiar with 
the parties' private code, and, would interpret the language of the 
written document as any "speaker of English." To protect oneself 
from the possibility of future betrayal by a contracting partner, a 
prudent party, in memorializing the terms of any such understand- 
ing, would not use a private code. As a result, in Holmes' view, the 
party utilizing a private code in this circumstance, assumes the risk 
of his contracting partner's duplicity. 
(E)ach party to a contract has notice that the other will understand his words 
according to the usage of the normal speaker of English under the circumstances, 
and therefore cannot complain if his words are taken in that sense) ° 
Even though this observation would support a far more expansive 
application of this exception to the Primacy Principle, Holmes, with- 
out adequate explanation, restricted his proposal to the use of "proper 
names.,,l 1 
7 Holmes, "The Theory of Legal Interpretation," 12 Har. L. Rev. (1899): 417. 
s Goode v. Riyal, 153 Mass. 585 (1891). 
9 See Holmes, supra. Note 6 at 420. 
l0 See Holmes, supra. Note 6 at 419. 
I I See W. Young, "Equivocation in the Making of Agreements," 64 Colum. 
L. Rev. (1964): 619, 623-625. In his discussion of Holmes' proposed exception, 
with which he had substantial reservations, Young observed that there was no 
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The practical need for the kind of exception proposed by Holmes, 
coupled with the seeming inability for any exception of this sort to 
be logically restricted, underscores an inherent tension between the 
theoretical extremes of both the objective and subjective schools. 
If Holmes' exception were applicable to all the terms of an agree- 
ment, not just proper names, it could swallow the Primacy Principle 
whole. Conversely, if the Primacy Principle were applied without 
any exception, unambiguous written contracts would be subject to 
substantial challenge in every instance where one of the contracting 
parties later claims that while the parties utilized the term "black" 
in their written agreement, they both actually meant "red." Grant 
Gilmore observed that where "the 'actual state of the parties' minds' 
is relevant, then each litigated case must become an extended factual 
inquiry into what was 'intended,' 'meant,' 'believed' and so on ''12 
which results in delay and substantial uncertainty. In a commercial 
context, where the utility of an agreement is often dependent upon 
the swift and certain enforcement of its terms, delays of this sort 
impinge upon the use of contract law to effectively order business 
relationships. More importantly, when the terms of a legally binding 
agreement are determined in large measure by the appeal to the trier 
of fact of one's party's witnesses compared to the appeal to the trier 
of fact of his adversary's witnesses, then the purportedly certainty 
in ordering relationships permitted by contract law is substantially 
reduced. 
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, proponents of the 
subjective school cannot abide any exception to the Primacy Prin- 
ciple. From Professor Corbin's perspective, to be consistent with 
its foundations, a body of law that is founded upon the exercise of 
individual free will, as contract law is, must insure that within the 
confines of all available evidence (not just a "meeting of the words") 
individual choice is fully investigated and properly put into effect. 
As Corbin observed, in criticizing even Holmes' limited exception 
to the Primacy Principle - 
The statement that no word or phrase has one true and unalterable meaning is 
as true of proper names as it is of common nouns and verbs. No name, whether 
"Peerless" or "John Smith" has any meaning in the absence of a user of it and of 
persuasive justification for restricting Holmes'  exception "on the grammarian's 
ground that no proper name was involved." Id. at 625. 
J2 G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 42 (1974). 
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surrounding circumstances. One who speaks or writes such a name usually has a 
meaning for it. The hearer or reader also gives it a meaning, perhaps a different 
one, one that is just as "correct," and one that may be just as reasonable to hold. 
A "normal speaker of English" (or of Sanskrit) could give it no meaning without 
knowing surrounding circumstances; and if he knew all the circumstances that 
were known to both the speaker and the hearer, he could still give it no "correct" 
meaning of his own. 13 
In pressing this argument, Corbin decrys the objective school of 
contract interpretation as founded upon a "great illusion- the illusion 
that words, either singly or in combination, have a 'meaning' that is 
independent of the persons who use them. ''~4 
Holmes' analysis of the famous Peerless case while further expli- 
cating the differences between the objective and subjective schools, 
also reveals certain similarities in their perspective. In Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus, 15 a seller in Bombay agreed to ship cotton on a ship 
named Peerless to an English buyer. At the time, there were two 
ships named Peerless: one known to the buyer which left Bombay in 
October (October Peerless) and the other known to the seller which 
left Bombay in December (December Peerless). At a trial, the buyer 
interpreted their agreement to mean October Peerless; whereas the 
seller contended that the parties intended shipment on December 
Peerless. In contrast to the Bunker Hill/Old South Church example, 
Raffles v. Wichelhaus involved the use of an ambiguous manifesta- 
tion of assent (Peerless) rather than the use of an unambiguous term 
(Bunker Hill). In analyzing the Peerless case, Holmes concluded 
that no contract formed in Raffles v. Wichelhaus because, irrespec- 
tive of their actual intentions, the parties' manifestations did not 
coincide. "There is no contract when the proper name used by one 
party (Peerless) means one ship (October Peerless), and that used 
by the other (Peerless) means another (December Peerless). ''I6 The 
Peerless case has been the subject of unending scholarly discussion. 
In the context of this article, however, Professor Melvin Eisenberg's 
13 3 Corbin, supra, Note 3, §535 at 16. 
14 1 Corbin, supra., Note 3, §106 at 474. 
15 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H&C 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex 1864) and in 33 
L.I.N.S. 160 (Ex. 1864). For the complete story of this celebrated case, see also 
A.W. Brian Simpson, "Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships 
Peerless," 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 287 (1989). 
t6 Holmes, supra., Note 6 at 418. References in parentheses are added to original 
text. 
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criticism of Holmes'  analysis o f  Raffles v. Wichelhaus has particular 
application: 
Holmes had it precisely backward; the result in Peerless is correct, not because 
the parties said different things, but because they meant different things. 17 
The fact that over the reach of several decades Holmes and Eisenberg 
can square off in a debate about this famous 19th century contract 
case and say, with defensible alacrity, that each others' conclusion is 
"right for the wrong reason" is because the subjective and objective 
schools of contract interpretation, despite their differing perspec- 
tives, share a common axis in orientation. 
II. THE PRIMACY DILEMMA 
In applying the Primacy Principle, proponents of the subjective 
school face a seemingly impenetrable barrier. This barrier results 
from the fact that since one cannot look into the mind of another 
person and observe what he is thinking, no advocate can present, as 
Exhibit A in his lawsuit, what might be called the plaintiff's "men- 
tal template" of a particular contract term. For the finder of fact, 
this apparent factual circumstance creates a di lemma (the "Prima- 
cy Dilemma"): (i) under the Primacy Principle, the trier of fact is 
charged with the task of ascertaining the actual intentions of the 
parties; (ii) since, however, the trier of fact has no way of directly 
viewing the actual intentions of another person, in arriving at his 
decision, the trier of fact can only rely upon the manifestations of 
parties and witnesses, which may or may not coincide with their 
actual intentions. 
To principled proponents of the subjective school, the most frus- 
trating aspect of the Primacy Dilemma is the realization that even 
after a trial, the full ascertainment of individual "will," the mission 
of the Primacy Principle, can never be certain. Corbin acknowledges 
that "the best" the trier of fact - 
•.. can do is to put himself so far as possible in the position of that person or 
persons, knowing their history and experience and their relations with other men 
and things, and then to determine what his own meaning and intention would 
have been. To do this requires a lively imagination, full and complete information 
17 Eisenberg, "Responsive Contract Law," 36 Stan L Rev. (1984): 1107, 1117. 
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obtained from the document and extrinsic testimony, and what we shall describe 
as sound judgment  and common sense.18 
While the objective school 's  blinder-like focus on a "meet ing  of  
the words"  has no place in the theoretical f r amework  o f  the subjec- 
tive school, the converse is not true. Al though much  more  restricted 
in application, the Pr imacy Principle nevertheless  finds a place in 
the theoretical f ramework  of  the objective school of  contract  inter- 
pretation. Indeed,  even Learned Hand acknowledged  the possibility 
that under  some circumstances a "meet ing  of  the minds"  must  take 
precedence  over a "meet ing  of  the words."  Learned Hand ' s  state- 
ments,  earlier referenced in this article, but  now fully stated, contain 
precisely such a caveat. 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, 
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of 
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and 
represent a known intent. I f . . .  it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, 
when he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning while 
the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual 
mistake or something else o f  the sort. 19 
In the context  of  this article, the significance of  Learned Hand ' s  
caveat is that while the trier of  fact under  the objective school will do 
so on a far less frequent  basis, he, too, f rom t ime-to-t ime,  will con- 
front the Pr imacy Di l emma in reaching an adjudicative decision. 2° 
Thus, while the objective and subjective schools do not  v iew the 
Pr imacy Principle as having the same position in their respective 
hierarchies of  contract  values, each acknowledge  the factual cir- 
cumstance  of  the Pr imacy Di lemma.  
From this perspective,  the principal difference be tween the 
objective and subjective schools is at what  point along the con- 
t inuum leading to the Pr imacy Di l emma  each resorts to a source 
of  information that is external to the parties themselves  to resolve 
18 3 Corbin, supra., Note 3, §536, at 34 (1960). [Italics added.] 
19 Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, supra., Note 5 (italics added). 
20 As a proponent of the objective school, Learned Hand's caveat is restricted 
to circumstances permitting the "reformation" of a contract. For the subjective 
school, except in instances where third parties are involved, questions of reforma- 
tion are no differently analyzed than those of interpretation. "Reformation... is 
merely the translation of their language into the language of other people, just as 
is true in the process that is called Interpretation." Corbin, supra., note 3, §540, at 
p. 92. 
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the matters  at issue. By interpreting words as any "speaker  o f  Eng- 
lish," the objective school applies this external solvent to the level of  
manifestat ions.  In so doing, and in all but the l imited c i rcumstance 
of  a "mutual  mistake,"  the objective school avoids any confrontat ion 
with the Pr imacy Di l emma by replacing the search for a "meet ing  
of  the minds"  with an analysis of  the "meet ing  o f  the words."  In 
contrast, until its inquiry collides with the opaque surface o f  the 
Pr imacy  Di lemma,  the subjective school applies its external solvent 
(Corbin 's  imaginative trier of  fact) only after permit t ing the trier o f  
fact to examine  all available evidence,  albeit circumstantial ,  of  each 
parties '  mental  template of  the contract  terms in dispute. 21 
III. EXHIBIT A 
If  the Pr imacy Di lemma did not  exist, that is, if  Exhibit  A - the 
mental  template possessed by a party at the t ime o f  manifest ing his 
or her  consent  to a contract  term - could be introduced as an exhibit  
at trial, the debate be tween the objective and subjective schools 
would  be at an end. Exhibit  A could satisfy the concerns of  both 
opposing theorists. It would  be, a t  o n c e ,  a "tangible intention" and an 
"unambiguous  word."  To further examine  the position of  the Pr imacy  
D i l emma  as an axis to both theories of  contract  interpretation, it is 
useful  to consider  how a trial would  be conducted  if Exhibit  A could 
be introduced into evidence.  Suppose, as Corbin mused,  22 Exhibit  
21 "How is a court to find out whether either party knew or had reason to know 
the intent or understanding of the other? Knowledge of such a factor may be 
proved by any evidence that is ordinarily admitted to prove a state of mind. This 
would include the party's own admissions, his actions from which knowledge 
may be inferred, testimony of statements and information given him from which 
knowledge may reasonably be inferred, and the usages and meanings of third 
persons with which he probably was familiar.., the court should be advised of all 
file surrounding circumstances; of the meaning that is given to the language of the 
agreement by common usage, by usage in the trade or business or profession of the 
parties; of communications between the parties during preliminary negotiations 
and during the execution of the writing; and of subsequent interpretations and 
practical application by either party that is assented to or acted upon by the other." 
3 Corbin, supra., note 3, §538, at pp. 66-69. 
22 "It may be that some day we may be able to observe a state of mind in 
the same way that we observe chemical processes and electrical discharges. At 
present, however, what we observe for judicial purposes is the conduct of the 
parties." 1 Corbin, supra., note 3, §9, at p. 20. 
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A could be identified through the use of an imaginary CT Scan 
that would probe the minds of contracting parties and display, in 
a holographic image, the mental template of a particular contract 
term that each contracting party possessed at the time the purported 
contract was formed. Apparatus of this sort would allow Eisenberg 
to compare the parties' respective mental templates of the ships 
Peerless and to authoritatively determine whether their intentions 
matched. Conversely, this imaginary CT Scan would allow Holmes 
to determine if the word "Peerless" as used by the parties in Raffles 
v. Wichelhaus had a single meaning and could thereby serve as an 
appropriate term to an enforceable contract. Such an examination, 
might even put Holmes' and Eisenberg's scholarly dispute to rest 
with the joint observation that there was no contract in Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus because the parties "Exhibit As" did not match. 
To fairly balance the scales of any trial where this imaginary CT 
Scan might be employed, however, requires an equally imagina- 
tive litigant. There is one fictional character, often cited by courts 
in contract disputes, who is particularly well suited to this chal- 
lenge - Lewis Carroll's ultimate purveyor of nonsense: Humpty 
Dumpty. 23 Humpty Dumpty's solvent to the Primacy Dilemma is 
neither Holmes' "speaker of English" nor Corbin's trier of fact. 
Humpty Dumpty's solvent is whimsy. 
23 Humpty Dumpty's famous assertion that a word "means just what I choose 
it to mean" is referenced in United States Supreme Court decisions, Tennessee 
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 US 153; 98 S Ct 2279; 57 L E d  2d 117; (1978) 
(opinion by Justice Berger); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 US 275; 
98 S Ct 566; 54 L E d  2d 538 (1978) (opinion by Justice Rhenquist); Secretary 
of  Agriculture v. United States, 350 US 162; 76 S Ct 244 ; 100 L E d  173 (1956) 
(opinion by Justice Frankfurter); as well as in appellate decisions of nearly every 
federal circuit: La Plante v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. 27 F 3d 731 (lst 
Cir 1994); Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Association v. Remington Arms Co. 
Inc., 989 F2d 1305 (2nd Cir 1993); United States ofAmerica v. Essig, 10 F 3d 968 
(3rd Cir 1993); Potomac Valve & Fitting v. Crawford Fitting, 829 F 2d 1280 (4th 
Cir 1987); Long v. Shultz Cattle Company, 881 F 2d 129 (5th Cir 1989) United 
Thermal v. Asbestos Training & Em., 920 F 2d 1345 (7th Cir 1991); Janklow v. 
Newsweek, Inc., 788 F 2d 1300 (8th Cir 1986); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez 
975 F 2d 1396 (4th Cir 1992); Meller v. The Heil Company, 745 F 2d 1297 (10th 
Cir 1984); Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F 2d 1508 (1 lth Cir 1985); Majewski v. B'Nai 
B'Rith Intern., 721 F 2d 823 (DC Cir 1983), and Woods v. Tsuchiya, 754 F 2d 
1571 (Fed Cir 1985). ALexis  search of "All States" and federal decisions finds 
the phrase "Humpty Dumpty" in 339 reported cases. 
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"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said. 
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't - till I tell you. I 
meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!'" 
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,'" Alice objected. 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means 
just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many 
different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all.  24'' 
In the role of defendant in the Case of the Black Car, Humpty 
Dumpty would not only assert that when he expressed his intent 
to the plaintiff painter, he (Humpty Dumpty) meant red despite the 
fact that he signed a contract that read black, but, would also assert, 
that in their contract the written term black means  red. Who is to 
control the meaning of this term - Humpty Dumpty or the plaintiff 
car painter? In the context of a lawsuit, the correct answer is, of 
course, the judge. But applying the Primacy Principle to Humpty 
Dumpty is highly problematic. If Humpty Dumpty is master of the 
meaning of words, how is the trier of fact ever to be certain that 
he has correctly interpreted what Humpty Dumpty means by the 
words he employs. For example, if Humpty Dumpty defines "glory" 
as "a nice knock-down argument," how does he define "argument," 
"nice," "a," or "knock-down?" Indeed, if Humpty Dumpty is not 
held to the meaning of Holmes'  "speaker of English" for any word, 
how can a trier of fact even begin to build a lexicon to communicate 
with Humpty Dumpty? Moreover, if words are subject to Humpty 
Dumpty's mastery, glory might have one meaning in one sentence 
and another meaning in another sentence. 
Given a litigant of Humpty Dumpty's  character, it might be that 
if the imaginary CT Scan were applied to Humpty Dumpty in the 
Case of the Black Car, Humpty Dumpty would produce inconsistent 
Exhibit As. A C T  Scan on Monday for the word "black" might 
produce an Exhibit A that signifies the color red, whereas, if Humpty 
Dumpty receives the same test on Wednesday, he may produce an 
Exhibit A signifying the number 5. Indeed, before one enters into 
24 L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, 94 (Random House 1964). 
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contract negotiations with Humpty Dumpty, it might be prudent 
to administer a CT Scan to Humpty Dumpty. This process might 
be repeated every day of negotiations, maybe every hour or even 
every minute. One might also find that when Humpty Dumpty uses 
words, he produces Exhibit As that are different from everybody 
else's Exhibit As. Whatever the case, Humpty Dumpty is either an 
advocate's ultimate dream or ultimate nightmare, or, maybe at once 
both. 
Humpty Dumpty's portrayal of the defendant car owner in the 
Case of the Black Car leads to an examination of the Primacy 
Dilemma from a philosophical perspective. In contrast to debates 
between proponents of the subjective school and objective school 
of contract interpretation, in philosophical discussions, the Primacy 
Dilemma has been viewed as a potential obstacle to the way that 
individuals learn the meaning of certain words, e.g., sensations. In 
this context, however, the legitimacy of the Primacy Dilemma is 
itself the subject of the debate. 
IV. LANGUAGE GAMES 
In Philosophical Investigations, 25 Ludwig Wittgenstein begins his 
examination of how individuals learn the meaning of words with a 
quotation from Augustine, Confessions, 1.8- 
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards 
something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they 
uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily 
movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the 
face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of 
voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding 
something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various 
sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after 
I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own 
desires. 26 
25 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, x ~ (1958) (hereinafter Philo- 
sophical Investigations). Wittgenstein is without question the most provocative 
philosopher of the 20th Century. In a biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk reports 
that despite the fact that Wittgenstein's principal work, Philosophical Investiga- 
tions was not published until 1951, as of 1990 there were 5,868 books and articles 
on his works. R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Duty of Genius (1990), see 
Introduction. 
26 Philosophical Investigations, § 1. 
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For example, according to Augustine's model, children learn the 
meaning of the term "chair" by observing others pointing at dining 
room chairs, living room chairs and patio chairs while mouthing the 
term "chair." The pupil's mastery of the term is demonstrated when 
he points out chairs to others and "mouths" the word "chair." While 
this model seems straight forward enough, Wittgenstein questions 
its utility. 
Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a 
strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it 
already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already 
think, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to 
itself. ,,27 
The inadequacies of Augustine's model become more apparent 
in wider application. One can learn about the correct use of the term 
"chair" by "pointing," but how does one learn the term "toothache?" 
To teach this term, Augustine's elders might point to a particular tooth 
and grimace, but they could also argue that while having one's elder 
point to his tooth and grimace may be confusing at first, the mean- 
ing of the term will become far more comprehensible the first time 
the pupil experiences a toothache. 28 In any event, the Augustinian 
formula for teaching the use of words to describe the sensation of 
pain does not so easily transfer to sensations not necessarily accom- 
panied by a physical reaction of the individual or some "natural 
expression for the sensation. ''29 Reflecting this criticism backwards, 
Wittgenstein asks, "What would it be like if human beings shewed no 
outward sign of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be 
impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache.'  ,,3o In the 
face of this criticism and others offered by Wittgenstein, proponents 
of the Augustinian model must rely upon an ever more elaborate, 
and seemingly never ending, series of refinements. As Wittgenstein 
makes clear, however, for every refinement of the Augustine model, 
his criticism simply proceeds to another level. Inevitably this line 
of analysis leads to the observation that even after experiencing a 
toothache, a pupil cannot know for certain if the sensation to which 
27 Philosophical Investigations, §32. 
28 "Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying 
'See, that's what pain is!' "Philosophical Investigations, §288. 
29 Philosophical Investigations, §256. 
3o Philosophical Investigations, §257. 
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he ascribes to the term "toothache" is the same sensation that his 
elders experience when they say the word "toothache,"  point  to a 
tooth and grimace. This obstacle to learning and certainty is the 
Pr imacy Dilemma.  
For  Corbin, the factual c i rcumstance of  the Pr imacy  Di l emma  is 
plate and template to the imperfections of  language. 
Words, oral or written, are merely a medium by which one person attempts to 
convey his thoughts to another person. They are merely audible sounds or visible 
sights. It is individual men who have "meanings" which they try to convey to 
others by the use of words; and it is individual men who receive "meanings" by 
reason of words used by others. 3j 
Their words and acts are called "expressions" because they are external symbols 
of the thoughts and intentions of one party, symbols that convey these thoughts 
and intentions to the mind of the other party. 32 
In the process of determining lack of identity in meaning, the meaning given by 
each party is a separate issue. 33 
In every language, the words and other symbols composing it are an imperfect 
instrument of expression, one that always requires for its sound interpretation a 
high degree of linguistic knowledge and human experience. 34 
To Corbin, language, through its "external  symbols ,"  forms an imper- 
fect bridge between the internal " thoughts  and intentions" of  two 
separate minds. It is the imperfect ions in this bridge that Corbin 's  
imaginative trier of  fact attempts to smooth over  through "lively 
imagination," "sound judgment , "  and " c o m m o n  sense." 
Bertrand Russell, who was Wittgenstein 's  early mentor  at 
Cambridge University, proposed a perspective and solution to the 
purported factual c i rcumstance posed by the Pr imacy Di l emma 
which resonates with Corbin 's  views. Russell,  who was clearly an 
imaginative trier of  fact, asserts that to link an individual 's  "mental  
phenomena"  to outward behavior  one must  depend upon a principle 
of  "analogical  inference:" 
31 1 Corbin, supra., note 3, §106, at p. 474. 
32 1 Corbin, supra., note 3, §107, at p. 478. 
33 3 Corbin, supra., note 3, §536, at p. 34. 
34 3 Corbin, supra., note 3, §544, at p. 158 (emphasis added). 
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The behavior of other peoples' bodies - and especially their speech behavior - is 
noticeably similar to our own, and our own is noticeably associated with "mental" 
phenomena. (For the moment it does not matter what we mean by "mental.") 
We therefore argue that other people's behavior is also associated with "mental" 
phenomena. Or rather, we accept this at first as an animal inference, and invent 
the analogy argument afterward to rationalize the already existing belief. 
Analogy differs from induction - at least as I am using the words - by the fact 
that an analogical inference, when it passes outside experience, cannot be verified. 
We cannot enter into the minds of others to observe the thoughts and emotions 
which we infer from their behavior. We must therefore accept analogy - in the 
sense in which it_goes beyond experience- as an independent premise of scientific 
knowledge . . . .  3 5  
Russell's so-called "principle of analogical inference" as a possible 
aide to modulate the "imperfections" of language as an "instru- 
ment of expression" directly parallels Corbin's requirement that the 
imaginative trier of fact employ "a high degree of linguistic knowl- 
edge and human experience." 
For Wittgenstein, however, analogy is not the solution to the 
apparent factual problem presented by the Primacy Dilemma. Instead, 
it is the cause. From his perspective, the Primacy Dilemma is a 
product of the misapplication of what Wittgenstein calls the "gram- 
mar" of one language game to a different language game. The point 
is not metaphysical. Indeed, it is precisely the opposite: 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday 
u s e .  36 
Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds 
light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings 
concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies 
between the forms of expression in different regions of language. 37 
While Wittgenstein's use of the term "language games" has subtle 
nuances, the Primacy Dilemma involves only two language games: 
the language games for "things external" and the language games for 
"things internal." The distinction between these two language games 
is based upon the concept of "pointing." The language game for 
"things external" involves only "things" that one can "point to," e.g., 
35 B. Russell, Human Knowledge, 193 (1960) (emphasis added). 
36 Philosophicallnvestigations, §116. 
37 Philosophical Investigations, §90 (emphasis added). 
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chairs, cars, ships. The language games for "things internal" does not 
permit "pointing" and involves sensations, intentions, memories, etc. 
Based upon these distinctions, Wittgenstein questions (1) whether 
it makes sense to apply the grammar of language games involving 
"things external" to language games for "things internal," e.g., to 
say that we possess "pain" as we might possess a "chair" when, 
unlike a "chair," one cannot point to "pain," and (2) whether this 
misapplication of grammar creates a compelling, yet false, image 
of reality. 3s What is placed at issue by Wittgenstein is the tool of 
analysis (the grammar of language games) not the apparent factual 
circumstance (the Primacy Dilemma). 
However much a work of genius, Wittgenstein's philosophy is 
not easily accessible. Nevertheless, certain passages in Philosophi- 
cal Investigations do permit a direct comparison of Wittgenstein's 
perspective of the Primacy Dilemma with the perspectives of legal 
theorists involved in issues of contract interpretation. 39 Based upon 
the Augustinian model of learning "colours," Wittgenstein proposes 
a language game in which "R" equals "red"'and "B" equals "black." 
Under this game, an arrangement of colored squares in the following 
sequence - 
l BLACK[ [BLACKI 
would be the equivalent of B R R B. While one might expect 
Augustine's pupils to master this game in short order, Wittgenstein 
begins to identify some problems associated with even so simple a 
model: 
Is it that the person who is describing the complexes of  coloured squares always 
says "R" where there is a red square; "B" when there is a black one, and so on? 
But what if he goes wrong in the description and mistakenly says "R" where he 
sees a black square - what is the criterion by which this is a mistake? 4° 
Wittgenstein acknowledges that this difficulty might be overcome 
by creating a reference table - 
38 "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of  cards and we are clearing 
up the ground of  language on which they stand." Philosophical Investigations, 
~118. 
39 Philosophical Investigations, §48-58. 
40 Philosophical Investigations, §51. 
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= B  
such that, in instances where there is a dispute between individuals 
as to the meaning of B and R, one could refer to the reference table 
to determine the correct application. However, like other proposed 
refinements to the Augustinian model, this solution creates its own 
difficulties. For example, who will make the reference table? What 
if he is mistaken? How will a party know if he is correctly applying 
the reference table to a particular situation or when he might have 
made a mistake? As an alternative to creating a single reference table, 
proponents of the Augustinian model might suggest that a number 
of reference tables be created. But this solution raises even more 
difficulties. Who makes the additional reference tables? How do we 
know if one table is the same as another table? Who decides? 
The piling on of refinements against counter-arguments by 
Wittgenstein in his discussions of sensations and other related mat- 
ters has led philosophy scholars, notably Saul Kripke, 41 to label 
Wittgenstein as the ultimate skeptic. He is not. Unlike Humpty 
Dumpty, Wittgenstein's purpose in pursuing these questions is not 
"glory." His aim, instead, is to expose false images of reality. And, 
since, in this expos6, he is necessarily restricted to the tools of the 
illusionist- language - the only way he can accomplish his task is to 
demonstrate the "senselessness" of their misapplications. The ~:ea- 
son that Philosophical Investigations, in its complex and seemingly 
disjointed passages, has few 90-degree angles, is that in exposing 
illusions of this sort, Wittgenstein cannot walk behind the stage of 
language to explain its trickery; the explanation must be made from 
the audience. 
Wittgenstein's analysis of the Augustinian model for learning 
"colours" is ultimately designed at exposing a particular false image, 
that is, the compelling idea that "red exists." 
. . .  the proposi t ion looks as if it were about  the colour, while it is suppose to 
be saying something about  the use of  the word "red." - In reality, however ,  we 
quite readily say that a part icular colour  exists; and that is as much  as to say that 
41 S. Kripke,  Private Language (1985). 
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something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate 
than the second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object.  42 
The reader must appreciate that the "red" under consideration in this 
context is not a tangible red, as opposed to the "red" that allows one 
to determine the color of the car in the Case of the Black Car. As 
Wittgenstein observed, 
One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of 
asking a thing's name. 43 
How does pointing to a colour differ from pointing to its shape. 44 
The creation of the false, yet compelling, image of reality that "red 
exists" is a direct result of analogizing objects that can be pointed 
to in language games involving "things external" to the grammar 
of language games involving "things internal," and, thereby, con- 
cluding that "red exists" in some intangible dimension. While this 
misapplication of the grammar may initially appear to have little 
correspondence to the axis of legal theories for contract interpre- 
tation, closer examination reveals identical mechanisms at work in 
both circumstances. 
To apply Wittgenstein's perspective to the problems addressed 
by legal theorists in the context of contract interpretation, one must 
begin with the observation that while one can "point" to a written 
agreement or verbal testimony, much as one can "point" to a chair, 
one cannot point to an "intention." As a result, when contract theo- 
rists refer to a party's intention or his mental template of a particular 
contract term - Party A's mental template of the contract term ("red" 
in the Case of the Black Car), as opposed to Party B's mental tem- 
plate of this term ("black") - they misapply the grammar of "things 
external" to "things internal." Exhibit A, like "red" is not an "it." 
In legal theories involving contract interpretation, the false image 
that a "mental template of contract term ... .  exists" is further com- 
pounded by the concept of possession. In his analysis of sensations, 
Wittgenstein notes that since no one else can experience my "pain," 
or your "pain," it is "senseless" to utilize the concept of possession 
42 Philosophical Investigations, §58. 
43 Philosophical Investigations, §30. 
44 Wittgenstein, The Brown Book, §3 (1958). 
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in this context. After  all - who, but me,  could possess m y  pain? If  
an idea of  this sort did make sense, one might  legi t imately question 
whether, when you feel pain, the pain felt is " m y  pain"  or " s o m e o n e  
else's pain. ''45 This analysis applies equally to concepts o f  posses -  
s ion  in the context of  a "mental  template of  a contract term," viz. 
m y  Exhibit  A. Who,  but me,  would p o s s e s s  m y  Exhibit  A or m y  
"unders tanding of  the meaning of  a particular contract te rm?"  
The final step in Wittgenstein 's  expose o f  the misapplication of  
this aspect of  the grammar  of  language games involving "things 
external" to language games involving "things internal" deals with 
comparison.  Significantly, the model  he selects to demonstrate  the 
"senselessness"  o f  the application of  the concept  of  "compar ison"  to 
circumstances involving "sensat ions" and "colours"  is identical to 
the Pr imacy Dilemma: 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! - 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "bettle." No one 
can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a bettle is only 
by looking at his bettle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have 
something different in his box. One might even imagine such a th!ng constantly 
changing. - But suppose the word "bettle" had a use in these people s language? 46 
By substituting the phrase "one party 's  mental  template o f  a contract 
term" for "bett le,"  the Primacy Di lemma can first be restated f rom 
Wittgenstein 's  perspective, and then exposed as illusory: 
Now someone tells me that he knows what a contract term [pain] is only from 
his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it one 
party's mental template of a contract term. No one can look into anyone else's 
box, and everyone says he knows what a contract term [pain] is only by looking 
at his mental template of the contract term. - Here it would be quite possible for 
everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a 
thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word mental template of the contract 
term had a use in these people's language? 47 
*** 
[If the word "bettle" or "one party's mental template of a contract term" or "pain" 
had a use in someone's language], it would not be used as the name of a thing. The 
thing in the box has no place in a language game at all; not even as a something: 
for the box might even be empty. - No one can "divide through" by the thing in 
the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the expression 
45 Philosophical Investigations, §253. 
46 Philosophical Investigations, §293. 
47 Philosophical Investigations, §293 [adapted]. 
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of sensations [or the "mental templates of contract terms"] on the model of "object 
and designation" the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. 48 
Under this formulation of the Primacy Dilemma and Wittgenstein's 
expos6, the idea that "pain," or the "mental template of a contract 
term," "exists," as if it were "something" that one could point to - 
the bettle- is a"false image." And, thus, the idea of possessing these 
"false images" - the "box" - is revealed, not as a circumstance of 
fact, but as an illusion. Under this analysis, it is clearly "senseless," 
even for the most imaginative of Corbin's triers of fact, to "divide 
through" or to attempt to "compare" one person's "bettle" or "mental 
template of a contract term" with anyone else's. It is a comparison 
of false images resulting in a mistaken assertion that there must be 
real enterprise in seeking to compare those "intangible objects"-  
the mental templates of meaning - that each of us possess but, that 
except through words, cannot otherwise express or identify. 
Corbin was correct in his observation that the "great illusion" 
to the objective school of contract interpretation is its assertion 
that "words have a meaning independent of the persons who use 
them." However, from Wittgenstein's perspective, supporters of both 
the subjective and objective schools of contract interpretation labor 
under an even greater illusion, the Primacy Dilemma. By "clearing 
misunderstandings away" involving the Primacy Dilemma through 
Wittgenstein's analysis, it becomes evident that the process at work 
in resolving legal disputes over the meaning of purported contract 
terms cannot involve a clash between the goals of the Primacy Princi- 
ple in never-ending conflict with the perceived factual circumstances 
of the Primacy Dilemma. Instead, this perceived conflict is revealed 
as the product of misapplied analogy. Shorn of its false images of 
reality, the concept of a "meeting of the minds" can be properly 
viewed as that "greater illusion." 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite a superficial similarity in circumstance, the dynamics of the 
judicial process of contract interpretation are not equivalent to the 
circumstances giving rise to the Primacy Dilemma. The Primacy 
48 Philosophical Investigations, §293 [adapted]. 
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Dilemma involves two parties; the judicial process involves a third: 
the court. This distinction is critical for while Wittgenstein's expos6 
of the Primacy Dilemma as illusion does not require that centuries 
of refinements to theories of contract interpretation be scrapped, it 
does require an abandonment of the ideal that courts "do not and 
cannot make contracts; courts merely enforce agreements that the 
parties themselves have reached." 
Unlike the philosophical search for meaning, in the judicial 
context, Exhibit A is real: it is the judgment of the court. The fact 
that courts often seek to legitimize their rendering of judgment 
(Exhibit A) through adherence to an illusionary conflict that purport- 
edly pits "individual will" against the "imperfections" of language 
as "an instrument for the expression" of "thoughts and intentions" 
masks the true processes at work. 
Although he did not have the benefit of Wittgenstein's insights 
into the Primacy Dilemma, Harvard's Dean Zachariah Chafee's 
instinct was right when he observed some 50 years ago in an address 
to the Judicial Section of the New York State Bar - 
In short, what is commonly called "the intention of  the parties" is in large measure 
the intention of  the judge, subject to all sorts of  traditional restraints of  his range 
of  choice. When all is said and done, the court of  last resort in an interpretation 
case can echo quite a bit of  the famous boast of  Humpty D u m p t y . . .  ["When I use 
a word . . .  it means what I choose it to m e a n . . .  -]49 
Once the illusion of the Primacy Dilemma is removed from the 
fray of an "interpretation case," the many arcane rules and principles 
of contract interpretation require some reorientation. As a starting 
point, the focus should be on how best to permit parties, through 
rules espoused by the objective school, to protect themselves from 
liars; while, at the same time, through rules promoted by the sub- 
jective school, to protect parties from becoming hobbled by their 
own mistakes or imprecise use of words. While less uplifting than 
the romanticism of the 16th century "will theory" of contracts, the 
proper orientation for legal theories of contract interpretation should 
proceed from these more tawdry, but undeniably certain, aspects of 
human experience. 
49 2. Chafee, "The Disorderly Conduct of  Words," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 381 (1941 ): 
401-402. 
